Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity Paperback / softback
by Gilbert (Princeton University) Harman, Judith (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Thomson
Part of the Great Debates in Philosophy series
Paperback / softback
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Description
Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism.
In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions.
In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.
Information
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Available to Order - This title is available to order, with delivery expected within 2 weeks
- Format:Paperback / softback
- Pages:240 pages
- Publisher:John Wiley and Sons Ltd
- Publication Date:25/11/1995
- Category:
- ISBN:9780631192114
Information
-
Available to Order - This title is available to order, with delivery expected within 2 weeks
- Format:Paperback / softback
- Pages:240 pages
- Publisher:John Wiley and Sons Ltd
- Publication Date:25/11/1995
- Category:
- ISBN:9780631192114
